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Abstract 
Many important decisions are made without precise information about the probabilities of the 
outcomes. In such situations, individual ambiguity attitudes influence decision making. The present 
study identifies affective states as a transient cause of ambiguity attitudes. We conducted two random-
assignment, incentive-compatible laboratory experiments, varying subjects’ affective states. We find 
that sadness induces choices that are closer to ambiguity-neutral attitudes compared with the joy, fear, 
and control groups, where decision makers deviate more from payoff-maximizing behaviors and are 
more susceptible to likelihood insensitivity. We also find a similar pattern in a representative 
population sample where cloudy weather conditions on the day of the survey - a proxy for sad affect - 
correlate with more ambiguity-neutral attitudes. Our results may help explain real-world phenomena 
such as financial markets that react to regular fluctuations in weather conditions. 
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1 Introduction 
A myriad of decision situations in the domains of both professional and private life involve 
incomplete or entirely absent information about the likelihood of decision outcomes. For example, 
novel technological developments or changing environmental framework conditions prohibit the 
extrapolation of past experiences and data to guide decision making (Knight 1921). Financial 
investments in publicly traded assets are also characterized by ambiguity because the future 
performance of assets can be influenced by external shocks with unforeseen consequences. 
Such ambiguity, i.e., the absence of precise, probabilistic information about decision 
outcomes, can influence decision making in ways that are not well explained by subjective expected 
utility (Savage 1954) if the preferences of people are sensitive to the availability of information 
(Ellsberg 1961). Importantly, ambiguity attitudes, i.e., the sensitivity of decision making to the 
availability of probabilistic information about the outcomes, are not identical to risk attitudes. 
Following Knight (1921), one can distinguish risk, where objective probabilities are available, from 
uncertainty or ambiguity, where they are not. In fact, several studies have shown that risk and 
ambiguity attitudes are only weakly correlated with each other, if at all (e.g., Agnew et al. 2008, 
Borghans et al. 2009). Furthermore, decisions under risk and ambiguity seem to engage partially 
separate neural systems (Huettel et al. 2006). For example, the relevance of ambiguity attitudes has 
been demonstrated in macroeconomics (Hansen and Sargent 2007), finance (Bossaerts et al. 2009, 
Dimmock et al. 2013, Dow and Werlang 1992), and strategic management (Amit and Schoemaker 
1993, Barney 1991). 
Individual attitudes toward ambiguity do not only involve subjective beliefs about possible 
decision outcomes but also reflect different degrees of confidence that people have in their own 
beliefs (Ellsberg 1961, p.657). Thus, decision making under ambiguity is influenced by personal 
judgments and confidence, which may be influenced by affective states in an affect-congruent manner 
(Bower 1981, Forgas 1995, Schwarz and Clore 1983). These subjective aspects may lead to temporary 
fluctuations of ambiguity attitudes that could induce “noisy” decision making, i.e., non-identical 
decisions of the same person in the same situation over time (Schelling 1984). If the ambiguity 
attitudes of many decision makers are simultaneously influenced by the same affective stimuli, self-
reinforcing dynamics with far-reaching consequences could result, such as financial bubbles due to 
herding effects (Devenow and Welch 1996, Nofsinger and Sias 1999). Thus, a better understanding of 
the causes of individual fluctuations in ambiguity attitudes may help decision makers avoid the 
negative consequences arising from unstable preferences (Schelling 1984) and also help explain why 
financial markets react to irrelevant information such as regular fluctuations in weather (Cao and Wei 
2005, Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003, Saunders 1993) and daylight (Kamstra et al. 2003) or the 
results of major sport competitions (Edmans et al. 2007). 
Experimental research designs are typically required to precisely quantify and understand the 
causal effect of affective states on behavior. The role of affect on risk preferences has been 
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experimentally studied both in psychology (e.g., Hockey et al. 2000, Isen and Patrick 1983, Johnson 
and Tversky 1983, Lerner and Keltner 2001, Yuen and Lee 2003) and in behavioral economics (e.g., 
Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003, Kamstra et al. 2000, 2003, Kliger and Levy 2003, Yuan et al. 2006). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no experimental studies have been conducted so far on the 
impact of affective states on ambiguity attitudes. Our study attempts to fill this void. 
Our paper presents the first set of studies directly testing the causal impact of affective states 
and weather on ambiguity attitudes. In two random-assignment, incentive-compatible laboratory 
experiments (Study 1 and Study 2) involving more than 500 subjects overall, we induced subjects 
with joyful, fearful, sad, and neutral affects in a between-subjects design by showing them short video 
clips prior to measuring ambiguity attitudes. In these experiments, we measured subjects’ willingness 
to bet on ambiguous events through probability equivalents. We elicited objective probabilities such 
that subjects were indifferent between winning a given money amount if some ambiguous events 
occurred and winning the same amount with these objective probabilities. The probability equivalents 
were used as indicators of ambiguity attitudes. 
In addition to these two experiments, we also studied whether our laboratory evidence is 
consistent with naturally occurring data (Study 3). To do so, we investigated the impact of weather, a 
typical proxy for affect (e.g., Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003, Kamstra et al. 2000, 2003, Kliger and 
Levy 2003, Saunders 1993), on ambiguity attitudes in a representative sample of the Dutch population 
(Dimmock et al. 2013). 
 
2. Related literature 
2.1 Ambiguity attitudes 
Keynes (1921) noted that the ratio of evidence in favor and against an event matters for 
decision makers (determining its probability) in addition to the total amount of evidence available. 
Nonetheless, the traditional method of studying ambiguity was to use Savage’s (1954) subjective 
expected utility model because risk was studied using von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) 
expected utility. The only difference between these models is that probabilities are subjective in the 
former and objective in the latter. In such an approach, people’s behavior is assumed to be the same 
without regard to whether the probabilities are objective. 
However, Ellsberg (1961) proposed a thought experiment that raised doubts about the 
descriptive validity of such an assumption. When people can choose which color they bet on (red or 
black) and then can choose between the known urn (50 red, 50 black balls) and the ambiguous urn 
(unknown proportion of the two colors), preferring the known urn cannot be explained by a model 
such as subjective expected utility nor by any probabilistically sophisticated models (Machina and 
Schmeidler 1992), i.e., models assuming similar behaviors for objective and subjective probabilities 
but relaxing the expected utility hypothesis. Many models have been proposed to accommodate 
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ambiguity attitudes, from Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility to Klibanoff et 
al.’s (2005) smooth ambiguity models or Hansen and Sargent’s (2001) multiplier preferences. 
Ellsberg’s paradox for expected utility has been confirmed in many experiments (Camerer 
and Weber 1992), highlighting the importance of ambiguity aversion as a behavioral pattern. 
However, ambiguity does not only generate aversion but may also decrease the ability of decision 
makers to discriminate between likelihood levels. The more ambiguity, the more decision makers 
behave as if their beliefs were close to 50-50. Sometimes called ambiguity-generated insensitivity, 
this phenomenon has been highlighted in several experimental studies (Abdellaoui et al. 2011, Kilka 
and Weber 2001, Maafi 2011). When comparing ambiguity attitudes at various likelihood levels, 
ambiguity-generated insensitivity leads to more ambiguity aversion for high-likelihood levels than for 
low ones, for which people might even be ambiguity seeking (Hogarth and Einhorn 1990). 
 
2.2 Affect, information processing, and ambiguity attitudes 
Insights from psychology about how affect influences information processing may help 
understand how it can impact choices under ambiguity. While negative affect is typically associated 
with more systematic and analytic forms of processing (e.g., Schwarz and Clore 1996), positive affect 
appears to promote intuitive and holistic information processing (e.g., Isen 1999, 2000, 2004). 
The distinction between positive and negative affect is common in the literature. By looking 
at “positive” versus “negative” or “neutral” affects, many studies treat affect as a unidimensional and 
bipolar construct (Clore et al. 1994, Forgas 1995, Schwarz 1990). Implicit in these comparisons is the 
assumption that all positive or all negative affective states are essentially equivalent. Under this 
assumption, fear and sadness would be expected to have similar effects. Both fear and sadness would 
lead to increased processing motivation (Schwarz 1990), a tendency to engage in a detail-oriented and 
systematic step-by-step analysis of the information at hand (Mackie and Worth 1989), low 
distractibility and a sustained analysis of problem material (Andrews and Thomson 2009). Likewise, 
positive affect such as joy would lead to reduced processing motivation (Schwarz 1990), greater 
reliance on heuristics and general knowledge structures (Ruder and Bless 2003), the activation of 
more widespread associative networks (Ashby et al. 1999), and increased distraction (Dreisbach and 
Goschke 2004). 
Some recent investigations (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001, Ranguthan and Pham 1999) have 
highlighted the importance of examining more discrete affective states, showing that discrete negative 
affective states such as anger and fear differentially impact judgment and decision-making outcomes 
because different positive affective states (e.g., pride versus cheerfulness) or different negative 
affective states (e.g., anger versus sadness) may have different circumplex structures (e.g., Russell 
1980, Watson and Tellegen 1985), different informative values (e.g., Pham 1998, Schwarz 1990), and 
different cognitive determinants (e.g., Lazarus 2001, Roseman and Smith 2001). 
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In this study, we look at two negative affective states, fear and sadness, because negative 
affects have demonstrated more mixed results than different positive affective states on decision 
making (Isen 1999, 2000, Schwarz et al. 1991). In addition, negative affective states and their effects 
on decision outcomes are more differentiated than positive affective states (e.g., Ellsworth and Smith 
1988). Finally, we focus on fear and sadness because they are among the most widespread forms of 
emotional distress and are thus likely to be of economic relevance (Ekman 1992, Scherer 2005). 
Within this perspective of discrete affective states, we seek to investigate the unique consequences of 
joy, fear, and sadness on ambiguity attitudes.  
We investigate whether fear and sadness have similar effects, i.e., enhanced information 
processing, and whether joy results in reduced information processing. If so, enhanced information 
processing would lead to “wiser” decisions, namely ambiguity-neutral choices, compared with 
reduced information processing, which may bias individuals’ ambiguity attitudes. 
 
3. Study 1 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Subjects 
We conducted Study 1 with 322 subjects in a German university’s laboratory for economic 
experiments in summer 2011. The participants were recruited using the Internet-based ORSEE system 
(Greiner 2004). Our sample consisted of 148 males and 174 females with an average age of 24 years 
(SE = 0.24). The youngest and oldest subjects were 18 and 61 years old. In total, 315 of the subjects 
were undergraduate students from various fields, and 7 were non-students. 
 
3.1.2 Affect induction procedure and control group 
At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects were randomly allocated to one of four 
treatment groups and signed consent forms confirming that they had read and understood the terms 
and conditions of the experiment and that the experimenters answered all of their questions 
sufficiently. The consent form also stated that the subjects could leave the experiment at any time, and 
in such a case, they would only receive their participation fee. The rest of the experiment was 
computerized, using z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
Before responding to the decision tasks, three of the groups were induced into either a joyful, 
fearful, or sad affective state using standardized film clips that were seven minutes long (Gerrards-
Hesse et al. 1994, Hewig et al. 2005, Westermann et al. 1996). Using film clips to manipulate affect is 
a standard method in psychological research (e.g., Heilmann et al. 2010, Lee and Andrade 2011, 
Lerner et al. 2004, Papousek et al. 2009). Film clips have been shown to be one of the most effective 
manipulations for positive and negative affective states (Gerrards-Hesse et al. 1994, Westermann et 
al. 1996). We used a joyful film clip from “When Harry met Sally” (1989), a fearful film clip from 
“Paranormal Activity” (2007), and a sad film clip from “The Champ” (1979) (more details about the 
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films are provided in Appendix A). Before watching the film clip, the subjects were asked to clear 
their mind of all thoughts, feelings, and memories. Affect induction has been shown to be more 
intense when explicit instructions are given (Westermann et al. 1996). One-quarter of the subjects 
served as the control group and did not receive any affect induction. This group is most comparable to 
standard experiments on ambiguity preferences. At the end of the experiment, the subjects in the fear 
and sadness group watched the film clip from the joy treatment as a counter induction (Göritz and 
Moser 2006). 
The subjects in the affected treatment groups were asked to fill out three subscales (joviality, 
fear, sadness) from the Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X, Watson and Clark 1994) 
before and after they watched the film clips. The control group answered these scales only once at the 
beginning of the experiment. We applied the joviality (e.g., happy, joyful, and delighted), fear (e.g., 
afraid, scared, and frightened), and sadness subscales (e.g., sad, blue, and downhearted) to assess 
individuals’ affective states. On each subscale, the subjects were instructed to indicate whether an 
affect-related statement properly describes their current state, from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).  
 
3.1.3 Experimental tasks 
We conducted two ambiguity tasks, one involving gains, the other involving losses. First, our 
subjects were given a gain task based on the traditional Ellsberg two-color problem. In this task, the 
subjects could win 800 experimental dollars (ED) if a red ball was drawn from one of two urns. The 
first urn (Urn 1) contained X red balls and (100 – X) black balls. The second urn (Urn 2) was 
ambiguous. It contained 100 balls, red or black, but the number of balls of each color was unknown. 
For all X from 0 to 90 with an increment of 10, the subjects were asked to report which urn they 
preferred. Table 1 displays the ten choices available to the subjects in the gain domain. 
 
Table 1: The ten choices in the gain domain available to the subjects in Study 1 
 Urn 1 Urn 2 Urn 1 Urn 2
1 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 0 red balls and 100 black balls. 
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
2 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 10 red balls and 90 black balls.
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
3 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 20 red balls and 80 black balls. 
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
4 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 30 red balls and 70 black balls. 
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
5 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 40 red balls and 60 black balls. 
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
6 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 50 red balls and 50 black balls. 
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
7 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 60 red balls and 40 black balls. 
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
8 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 70 red balls and 30 black balls. 
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
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9 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 80 red balls and 20 black balls. 
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
10 Win 800 ED if a red ball is drawn from an 
urn with 90 red balls and 10 black balls. 
Win 800 ED if a red ball is 
drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
O O 
 
For X = 0, the subjects were likely to prefer Urn 2, which might at least have some red balls. 
As X and thus the number of red balls increased, Urn 1 became more attractive. We define the 
probability equivalent of the subjects in this task as their switching point, i.e., the midpoint between 
the highest X for which subjects preferred Urn 2 and the lowest X for which they preferred Urn 1. This 
probability equivalent can be interpreted as the subjects’ willingness to bet on the ambiguous event 
and is therefore a measure of their ambiguity attitude. Ambiguity neutrality corresponds to a 
probability equivalent of 50%. Thus, a probability equivalent of less than 50% indicates ambiguity 
aversion, and a probability equivalent of more than 50% indicates ambiguity seeking in this gain task. 
The second ambiguity task was similar but with losses. In Table 1, “Win 800 ED” was 
replaced by “Lose 400 ED.” In this task (and unlike the previous one), for X = 0, Urn 1 was more 
attractive because there was no risk of drawing a red ball and losing money. We define the probability 
equivalent in this loss task as the midpoint between the highest X for which subjects preferred Urn 1 
and the lowest X for which they preferred Urn 2. The interpretation is reversed with respect to the gain 
task: a probability equivalent of less than 50% indicates ambiguity seeking (switching “early” to the 
ambiguous urn), and a probability equivalent of more than 50% indicates ambiguity aversion. 
In addition to these two ambiguity tasks (the gain task and the loss task), the experiment 
consisted of two other decision tasks and several questionnaires measuring the subjects’ affect and 
personality traits. Further details are provided in Appendix A. 
 
3.1.4 Incentives 
We varied the presence and magnitude of the financial incentives across subjects and within 
the four treatment groups. Overall, 142 subjects played with fixed financial stakes, 144 with low 
financial stakes and 36 with high financial stakes. The fixed-stakes treatment instructions indicated 
that, regardless of their performance, the subjects would receive a 9 EUR payoff at the end of the 
experiment. The subjects in the low- and high-stakes treatments were instructed that their payoff at 
the end of the experiment would depend on their decisions during the experiment. The subjects in the 
low-stakes treatment received an attendance fee of 4 EUR, and two randomly selected choices among 
the ten ambiguity task decisions was played for real money, with an exchange rate 100 ED equaling 1 
EUR. Hence, potential losses would be covered by the initial endowment. The subjects in the low-
stakes treatment therefore had the opportunity to earn up to 8 EUR more in the ambiguity tasks but 
also to lose their participation fee. The subjects in the high-stakes treatment received the same 
payoffs, but they also had a 1/36 (or 2.8%) chance for a higher exchange rate for the experimental 
dollars, which would become 1 ED = 1 EUR instead of 100 ED = 1 EUR. For these subjects, the loss 
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question would not be played for real. After the experiment, one subject from the high-stakes 
treatment was randomly drawn and paid at the high exchange rate. 
 
  
3.2 Results 
The self-reported affects using the PANAS-X scales indicate that all of the affect inductions 
had the desired effect (see Appendix A). For the analysis of probability equivalents, we excluded 21 
subjects for the gain task and 28 subjects for the loss task because they did not satisfy monotonicity, 
switching more than once between the urns or preferring first Urn 2 and then Urn 1 in the gain task, 
and first Urn 1 and then Urn 2 in the loss task. These subjects either had inconsistent ambiguity 
preferences or did not understand the tasks. A Chi2 test gave no indication that the excluded subjects 
were non-randomly distributed across the experimental treatments for the gain task (Chi2 = 0.14, p = 
0.99) or for the loss task (Chi2 = 0.89, p = 0.98). 
We performed poolability tests (Chow 1960, Gujarati 1970) to examine whether the financial 
stakes treatments, the order of the experimental tasks, education, and gender had structurally different 
effects on the relationship between affect and ambiguity attitudes in the gain and the loss domains. 
The results indicate that only the order of the financial stakes treatments and the order of the 
experimental tasks show evidence against poolability. Therefore, we included these experimental 
conditions as control variables in the multivariate analyses reported below.1 We apply analyses of 
covariances (ANCOVAs) instead of regressions because regression techniques only show the 
difference between a (arbitrary) reference group and the other groups instead of showing the full set 
of differences between all of the groups. 
 
   Gains           Losses 
 
Figure 1: Probability equivalents for gains (left panel) and losses (right panel) in Study 1 (dots are 
averages, bars indicate standard errors, and dashed lines represent ambiguity neutrality) 
 
Figure 1 represents the average probability equivalents displayed in Table 2. For both 
ambiguity tasks, we ran analyses of (co)variances (ANCOVA/ANOVA) to study the effects of the 
                                                            
1 Detailed results of the poolability analyses are available upon request. 
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four treatment groups on the probability equivalents. In both the gain and the loss domains, the 
payoff-maximizing switching point was at 50%.  
In the gain domain, we observe an average probability equivalent of 42%. Hence, on average, 
our subjects were ambiguity averse for this task. The control group deviates the furthest from purely 
payoff-maximizing preferences (39% probability equivalent), followed by the joy and fear groups 
(both 42%). The subjects in the sadness group were less ambiguity averse than the other groups. With 
an average probability equivalent of 46%, the subjects in the sadness group came close to the 
expected payoff-maximizing preferences. If we interpret the probability equivalents as the willingness 
to bet, the subjects in the sadness group were 18% (44% / 39% - 1 = 18%) more willing to bet on the 
ambiguous urn than the subjects in the control group.  
Pairwise mean comparisons between the experimental groups, represented by Cohen’s ds, 
standard errors of Cohen’s ds, and significance levels in Table 2, reveal that the average probability 
equivalent of the sadness group was higher than that of the other groups, with ds ≥ 0.28.2 
Furthermore, when we include control variables, the average probability equivalent of the joy group 
was higher than that of the control group, with d = 0.28.  
 
Table 2: Means (M) and standard errors (SE) from ANCOVA and pairwise comparisons of the 
probability equivalents across experimental groups in Study 1 
 Statistic M SE N Cohen’s ds (SE of ds) and significance levels 
  
Experimental 
groups 
    
Control 
 
Joy 
 
Fear 
Gains Control 0.39 0.01 74    
Joy 0.42 0.01 75 0.21(0.17)/ 
0.28(0.17)* 
  
Fear 0.42 0.01 76 0.22(0.16)/ 
0.24(0.17) 
0.02(0.16)/ 
0.04(0.16) 
 
Sadness  0.46 0.01 76 0.56(0.17)***/ 
0.55(0.17)*** 
0.35(0.17)**/ 
0.29(0.16)* 
0.34(0.16)**/ 
0.33(0.16)** 
 
Losses 
 
Control 
 
0.45 
 
0.01 
 
73 
   
Joy 0.48 0.01 72 0.27(0.17)/ 
0.31(0.17)** 
  
Fear 0.45 0.01 75 0.05(0.17)/ 
0.04(0.17) 
0.21(0.17)/ 
0.27(0.17)* 
 
Sadness  0.45 0.01 74 0.01(0.16)/ 
0.01(0.16) 
0.27(0.17)/ 
0.30(0.17)* 
0.04(0.16)/ 
0.03(0.16) 
Notes: For both ambiguity tasks, we ran an ANOVA and then an ANCOVA (i.e., we added control 
variables) to study the effects of the four treatment groups on the probability equivalents. In the table, 
pairwise comparisons are represented by Cohen’s ds (SE of ds), and the significance levels are based 
                                                            
2 Cohen’s d is an effect size for the comparison of two means, denoting the size of the standardized mean 
difference. Cohen (1988) suggests that d = 0.20 describes a small effect, d = 0.50 a medium effect, and d = 0.80 
a large effect. 
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on Fisher’s least significant differences (LSD) post-hoc tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 
0.01. The first cell entry reports the ANOVA result, the second ANCOVA. 
Model diagnostics: Ambiguity attitudes for gains (N=301): ANOVA [F (3, 297) = 4.22, p = 0.01, 
partial η2 = 0.04];3 ANCOVA (controls: financial stakes treatments, order of the experimental tasks, 
age, gender): [F (3, 291) = 4.19, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.04]. 
Ambiguity attitudes for losses (N=294): ANOVA: [F (3, 290) = 1.12, p = 0.34, partial η2 = 0.01]; 
ANCOVA (controls: financial stakes treatments, order of the experimental tasks, age, gender): [F (3, 
284) = 1.63, p = 0.18, partial η2 = 0.02]. 
 
The interpretation for the loss domain is reversed with respect to the gain domain, and a 
probability equivalent below 50% describes ambiguity-seeking preferences for losses. Because we 
observe an average probability equivalent of 46%, our subjects were slightly ambiguity seeking in the 
loss domain, as is often found in the literature (Wakker 2010, p. 354). However, the subjects were 
overall less ambiguity seeking for losses than they were ambiguity averse for gains, as seen when 
comparing the left and right panels of Figure 1. We find differences (ds ≥ 0.21) between the joy group 
and the three other groups in the loss domain, and the subjects were less ambiguity seeking in the joy 
group. 
 
3.3 Conclusion of Study 1 and introduction of Study 2 
The results of Study 1 show that ambiguity attitudes can be influenced by randomly induced 
affective stimuli that are irrelevant for the decision tasks, such as watching a Hollywood film clip 
before making a financial decision. In particular, the subjects in the sadness group behaved more in 
line with ambiguity neutrality in the gain task than the subjects in the control, joy or fear groups. The 
results of Study 1 are suggestive, but the experimental design has some caveats that we attempt to 
address in Study 2. Both studies were conducted with different experimental pools, i.e., at different 
universities in different countries. Thus, Study 2 also serves as an independent replication of Study 1. 
First, it was not possible to determine whether the results of Study 1 were driven by affect per 
se, by the effects of watching a film clip, or by the fact that the subjects who watched a film clip and 
subsequently answered the affect scales were made aware of their current affective state. To address 
these concerns in Study 2, we added two control groups: A control group who watched a film clip that 
induced a neutral mood, and a control group in which the subjects were asked to describe their current 
affective state (so as to be aware of their mood without watching a movie). 
Second, a portion of the results of Study 1 could also come from an experimenter’s demand 
effect because the subjects may have guessed the purpose of the experiment. In Study 2, we therefore 
asked the subjects to answer a few questions about the movie clip. When piloting the study with 50 
students, we noticed that this simple manipulation prevented the subjects from discovering the real 
purpose of the experiment. Moreover, the subjects were told they would be paid for their correct 
                                                            
3 Partial eta squared describes the proportion of variability associated with an effect when the variability 
associated with all other effects identified in the analysis has been removed from consideration (Fritz et al. 
2012). 
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answers to the film questions to give them an incentive to concentrate when watching the film clips. 
Because we found the affect induction was effective, we decided not to apply the affect measures in 
Study 24 to make the purpose of the experiment less obvious. 
Third, a portion of the ambiguity aversion we observed in the gain task in Study 1 could have 
come from subjects whose payoffs depended on the presence of red balls in the ambiguous urn; they 
may have suspected that the experimenters put few red balls in this urn. Of course, this concern would 
apply for all of the affect treatments as well as for the control group. Moreover, this concern is 
inconsistent with the result that the subjects were ambiguity seeking for the loss task, where, 
following the same reasoning, they should have assumed that there were many red balls in the 
ambiguous urn. Nevertheless, we avoided this problem in Study 2 by asking the subjects to bet on an 
event and on its complementary event, so that it would be clear that we could not manipulate their 
payoffs. In addition, we included extra questions to examine whether our results depended on the 
subjects’ beliefs about those events. 
Finally, the result from Study 1 that the subjects were less ambiguity averse in the sadness 
treatment in the gain domain did not tell us how sadness would affect situations in which people are 
ambiguity seeking in the gain domain, which typically occurs at low-likelihood levels. Hence, Study 2 
varied the likelihood of winning in the ambiguous options. 
 
4. Study 2 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Subjects 
The second experiment was conducted with 241 undergraduates in the behavioral laboratory 
of a Dutch university in spring 2012. The participants were recruited using the Internet-based ORSEE 
system (Greiner 2004). The sample consisted of 141 male and 100 female students with an average 
age of 21 (SE = 0.15). The youngest and oldest subjects were 18 and 29 years old. All of the students 
were studying economics or economics-related subjects. 
 
4.1.2 Affect induction procedures and control groups 
Similar to Study 1, the experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Six 
experimental groups were implemented in Study 2. The subjects in the sadness, joy, and fear groups 
watched the same film clips as in Study 1 and were informed beforehand that they would have to 
answer questions about it. As in Study 1, the subjects were asked to clear their mind of all thoughts, 
feelings, and memories before watching the film clip. After watching the clip, the subjects indicated 
whether they had seen the movie before and completed the ambiguity tasks described below. 
Immediately after the two ambiguity sections, we asked the subjects six questions to study subjects’ 
                                                            
4 Except for the control group, where we wanted the subjects to be aware of their current affect. 
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beliefs (please see Appendix B). Following the ambiguity tasks, the subjects answered five questions 
about the film clip, for which they received €0.50 per correct answer. 
The three other experimental groups were control groups. Control Groups 1 and 2 watched a 
seven-minute clip from the movie “All the President’s Men” (1976), which has previously been 
shown to induce a neutral affective state (Gross and Levenson 1995, Hewig et al. 2005). Control 
Group 1 watched the clip after the ambiguity tasks, making it comparable to the control group in 
Study 1, i.e., investigating the subjects’ ambiguity attitudes when they were in a (positive) resting 
mood, without making their current mood salient to them (e.g., Clore and Huntsinger 2007, Schwarz 
and Clore 1983).  
The subjects in Control Group 2 watched the neutral film clip before the ambiguity tasks (as 
in the sadness, joy, and fear groups). This control group allowed us to test whether watching a movie 
per se had an influence on ambiguity attitudes. The subjects in Control Groups 1 and 2 answered the 
five questions about the film clip after they had completed the ambiguity tasks. 
Finally, the subjects in Control Group 3 did not watch a film clip but were made aware of 
their current affective state (Gasper 2004, Schwarz and Clore 1983). These subjects indicated their 
current affective state on three subscales (joviality, fear, sadness) of the PANAS-X (Watson and Clark 
1994, Watson et al. 1988) and were subsequently asked to “please write a few sentences about why 
you feel like this at the moment on a separate piece of paper.” After writing their explanations, the 
subjects completed the ambiguity tasks. In contrast to Study 1, the additional Control Groups 2 and 3 
in Study 2 allowed us to disentangle the induced mood effects in the treatment groups from two 
potential confounds, i.e., watching a film clip and being aware of one’s current affective state. 
The subjects in all of the groups watched the same short film clip from “For the Birds” (Pixar 
2001, three minutes) at the end of the experiment and answered five incentivized questions about the 
film afterwards. This procedure served three purposes. First, the subjects in the negative affect 
treatments watched this film clip as a counter induction (Göritz and Moser 2006). Second, this film 
clip helped to serve as a cover story to make the purpose of the study less evident to the subjects and 
thus reduce the demand effects that might artificially inflate the effect associated with the 
manipulations. Third, the subjects could win money by answering these film questions correctly in 
case they did not win money in the ambiguity tasks. 
 
4.1.3 Ambiguity tasks 
The second study used slightly modified ambiguity tasks compared with Study 1. We 
replaced ball colors with geometric figures to avoid colors that could impact the subjects’ affect. 
Moreover, we varied the likelihood of winning by providing three types of geometric figures. The 
subjects were told that two urns contained 9 tickets each, and one geometric figure was represented on 
each ticket. 
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Urn A contained X triangles, Y squares, and 9 – X – Y rectangles. We varied X and Y across 
choices, from X = 0 to X = 9. Urn B also only contained triangles, squares, and rectangles, but in an 
unknown proportion. The subjects were given two tasks. In each task, they were asked to make a 
series of ten choices among the urns, with each choice corresponding to a value for X. In one task (the 
triangle task), they would win 20 EUR if a triangle was drawn from the urn they chose, and in the 
other task (the rectangle or square task), they would win the same amount if a rectangle or a square 
was picked from the urn. We randomized the order of these tasks across subjects. Table 3 represents 
the ten choices in each task. 
 
Table 3: The ten choices subjects were asked to make in each task in Study 2 
 Urn A Urn B Urn A Urn B 
1 O O 
2 O O 
3 
 
O O 
4 
 
O O 
5 
 
O O 
6 
 
O O 
7 
 
O O 
8 
 
O O 
9 
 
O O 
10 
 
O O 
 
In the triangle task, Urn B was more attractive at the top of the table, but Urn A became more 
and more attractive the further down subjects went. In the square or rectangle task, the opposite was 
true. For both tasks, we explained this situation to the subjects so that they would be less likely to 
switch more than once between the urns and to facilitate monotonic decisions. 
If triangles, squares, and rectangles are exchangeable in Urn B, i.e., if the subjects bet 
indifferently on any of these figures (Abdellaoui et al. 2011), we can compare a bet on one geometric 
figure in Urn B with a bet that gives a 1/3 chance to win. In the triangle task, an ambiguity-neutral 
subject should strictly prefer Urn A from the fourth row onward. If the subjects prefer Urn B for X but 
Urn A for X + 1 (X being the number of triangles in Urn A), we define their probability equivalent for 
triangles as (X + 0.5)/9. Switching to Urn A after the fourth row would indicate ambiguity seeking and 
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
lead to a probability equivalent higher than 1/3. The reasoning is reversed for the square or rectangle 
task. If the subjects prefer Urn A for X but Urn B for X + 1, we define their probability equivalent for 
triangles as (8.5 – X)/9. Switching to Urn B after the fifth row (X = 4) would give a probability 
equivalent lower than 2/3 and would indicate ambiguity aversion. 
After the subjects completed the twenty choices, we asked them six questions to check 
whether their beliefs were compatible with exchangeability. The purpose of these questions was to 
test whether the subjects had reason to believe that there were more triangles or rectangles or squares 
in Urn B. This assumption was used to interpret the probability equivalents as indicators of ambiguity 
attitudes, and the beliefs of 151 subjects were in line with such reasoning. We used these observations 
as a robustness check in the following analysis. 
 
4.1.4 Incentives 
At the end of the experiment, socio-demographic information was collected, and one of the 
twenty choices in the ambiguity tasks was randomly selected by throwing a twenty-sided die. The 
subjects then drew a ticket from the urn they preferred and were paid accordingly. The payoff 
consisted of the participation fee (5 EUR), the payoff for the ambiguity tasks (0 EUR or 20 EUR), and 
the amount of correctly answered questions about the film (between 0 EUR and 5 EUR or between 0 
EUR and 2.50 EUR for Control Group 3). The subjects were paid in cash and received their payoffs 
separately. The payoffs ranged between 6 EUR and 30 EUR. 
 
4.2 Results 
Ten subjects displayed choices that violated monotonicity, for instance, preferring the risky 
urn for a probability p of winning but preferring the ambiguous urn in spite of the risky urn becoming 
more attractive with a probability of winning that was higher than p. We excluded these subjects from 
the following analyses. 
 Triangles     Rectangles or squares 
  
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
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Figure 2: Probability equivalents for triangles (left panel) and rectangles or squares (right panel) in 
Study 2 (dots are averages, bars indicate standard errors, and dashed lines represent ambiguity 
neutrality) 
 
Figure 2 shows the means and standard errors of the treatment groups for 1/3 (triangles) and 
2/3 (rectangles or squares) probability of winning. Overall, the subjects were ambiguity seeking for 
triangles (probability equivalents higher than 1/3) but ambiguity averse for squares and rectangles 
(probability equivalent lower than 2/3). 
We performed poolability tests (Chow 1960, Gujarati 1970) to examine whether the ordering 
of the ambiguity tasks, having seen the film before, education, gender, university, or employment 
status had structurally different effects on the relationship between affect and ambiguity attitudes. In 
the poolability tests, we found no evidence against poolability for most of these variables except the 
order of the ambiguity tasks and whether the subjects studied at the authors’ home university or at 
another university (in the following, this variable is called university).5 Therefore, we included 
university and the order of the tasks as control variables in the ANCOVAs reported below. 
Table 4 displays the results of all of the pairwise comparisons from an ANOVA and two 
ANCOVAs with Cohen’s ds, standard errors of Cohen’s ds, and significance levels. The main finding 
is again that the subjects in the sadness group were less ambiguity seeking than the subjects in all of 
the other groups for the triangle task (1/3 probability equivalent of winning). We also ran the analysis 
for the subjects whose answers were consistent with exchangeability of triangles, rectangles, and 
squares. Our conclusions remain unchanged. It is worth noting that the mean probability equivalents 
for the triangle task were 38% for the sadness group and 44% for the joy and fear groups, which 
implies a difference in terms of willingness to bet of 16% (44% / 38% - 1 = 16%), showing that the 
effect is not only statistically noticeable but also economically relevant. 
We did not find any effect of watching a movie per se, as indicated by the absence of 
differences between Control Group 2 (who watched a neutral movie clip before the ambiguity tasks) 
and Control Group 1 (who watched the neutral movie clip after the ambiguity tasks). The behavior of 
the subjects who were made aware of their current affective state by affect scales and self-reference 
statements (Control Group 3) did not differ from the behavior of the subjects in the other control 
groups. Hence, the effect of the sadness treatment does not seem to be explained by our subjects being 
distracted by a movie or by making them aware of their current affective state.6  
 
                                                            
5 Most of the subjects from another university were from a university of applied sciences in which the education 
is more practice-oriented. Detailed results of the poolability analyses are available upon request. 
6 As a side result, we found that the subjects of Control Group 3 (N = 36) were in a positive resting mood (Clore 
and Huntsinger 2007, Schwarz and Clore 1983). They were “moderately” joyful (M = 3.15, SE = 0.14) and had 
scores for fear and sadness between “not at all” and “a little” (fear: M = 1.37, SE = 0.07; sadness: M = 1.54, SE 
= 0.12). 
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Table 4: Means (M), standard errors (SE), and pairwise comparisons of the probability equivalents across experimental groups in Study 2 
 Statistic M SE N Cohen’s ds (SE of ds) and significance levels  
 Experimental groups    Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Joy Fear 
Triangle Control 1 0.41 0.02 40      
Control 2 0.42 0.02 40 0.19(0.23)/ 
0.17(0.23)/ 
0.45(0.23) 
    
Control 3 0.43 0.02 36 0.16(0.23)/ 
0.19(0.23)/ 
0.48(0.23)* 
0.02(0.23)/ 
0.02(0.23)/ 
0.03(0.23) 
   
Joy 0.44 0.02 31 0.38(0.23)/ 
0.36(0.23)/ 
0.44(0.23) 
0.20(0.23)/ 
0.20(0.23)/ 
0.01(0.23) 
0.22(0.22)/ 
0.18(0.22)/ 
0.04(0.22) 
  
Fear 0.43 0.02 36 0.36(0.23)/ 
0.18(0.23)/ 
0.43(0.23) 
0.17(0.23)/ 
0.02(0.23)/ 
0.02(0.23) 
0.19(0.25)/ 
0.00(0.25)/ 
0.06(0.25) 
0.03(0.22)/ 
0.17(0.22)/ 
0.01(0.22) 
 
Sadness  0.38 0.01 49 0.22(0.24)/ 
0.24(0.24)/ 
0.05(0.24) 
0.41(0.24)*/ 
0.41(0.24)*/ 
0.49(0.24)* 
0.39(0.24)*/ 
0.42(0.24)*/ 
0.53(0.24)** 
0.61(0.22)***/ 
0.60(0.22)***/ 
0.48(0.22)* 
0.58(0.24)***/ 
0.42(0.24)*/ 
0.47(0.24)* 
Square 
or 
rectangle 
Control 1 0.52 0.02 40      
Control 2 0.51 0.02 40 0.02(0.23)/ 
0.07(0.23)/ 
0.06(0.23) 
    
Control 3 0.50 0.02 35 0.11(0.23)/ 
0.17(0.24)/ 
0.14(0.23) 
0.09(0.23)/ 
0.10(0.23)/ 
0.08(0.23) 
   
Joy 0.51 0.02 32 0.11(0.24)/ 
0.14(0.24)/ 
0.22(0.24) 
0.09(0.24)/ 
0.06(0.24)/ 
0.28(0.24) 
0.003(0.25)/ 
0.04(0.25)/ 
0.35(0.25) 
  
Fear 0.50 0.02 37 0.03(0.23)/ 
0.20(0.23)/ 
0.00(0.23) 
0.003(0.23)/ 
0.13(0.23)/ 
0.06(0.23) 
0.09(0.24)/ 
0.03(0.24)/ 
0.14(0.24) 
0.09(0.25)/ 
0.07(0.25)/ 
0.22(0.25) 
 
Sadness  0.52 0.02 48 0.06(0.22)/ 
0.03(0.22)/ 
0.20(0.22) 
0.04(0.22)/ 
0.04(0.22)/ 
0.14(0.22) 
0.05(0.23)/ 
0.15(0.23)/ 
0.06(0.23) 
0.05(0.23)/ 
0.11(0.23)/ 
0.42(0.23) 
0.04(0.22)/ 
0.17(0.22)/ 
0.20(0.22) 
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Notes: Per cell, we report the results of an ANOVA and two ANCOVAS (the second ANCOVAs are 
restricted to subjects whose beliefs satisfy exchangeability) to study the effects of the six treatment 
groups on ambiguity attitudes. In the table, pairwise comparisons are represented by Cohen’s ds (SE 
of ds), and the significance levels are based on Fisher’s least significant differences (LSD) post-hoc 
tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.  
Model diagnostics: Triangle task (N = 231): ANOVA: [F (5, 226) = 2.14, p = 0.06]; ANCOVA 
(controls: order of the experimental tasks, university, employment status): [F (5, 217) = 1.69, p = 
0.14]; ANCOVA with same controls restricted to subjects satisfying exchangeability: [F (5, 133) = 
1.62, p = 0.16]. Effect size for experimental groups across all analyses: partial η2 = 0.04.  
Square or rectangle task (N = 231): [ANOVA: F (5, 226) = 0.09, p = 0.99]; ANCOVA (controls: 
order of the experimental tasks, university, employment status): [F (5, 217) = 0.26, p = 0.93]; 
ANCOVA with same controls restricted to subjects satisfying exchangeability: [F (5, 133) = 0.64, p = 
0.67]. Effect size for experimental groups across all analyses: partial η2 = 0.01. 
 
4.3 Conclusion of Study 2 and introduction of Study 3 
Study 2 confirms that affective states can impact ambiguity attitudes. In particular, sadness 
reduced the deviations from rational behavior (understood as payoff or expected utility 
maximization). Only one of the two tasks was influenced, but the effect of sadness in both tasks 
pointed in the same direction, i.e., weaker deviations from ambiguity neutrality. 
Despite their advantages in isolating causal effects, laboratory experiments such as those we 
conducted for Studies 1 and 2 are sometimes criticized because their student subject pools are not 
representative of the population, the sample sizes are relatively small, and the decision situations are 
unnatural (Falk and Heckmann 2009). One possibility to address such concerns is to complement 
evidence from the laboratory with naturally occurring data from large, representative population 
surveys (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000). Such additional evidence would help to test the external 
validity of laboratory results. Study 3 reports such evidence and also allows us to link our results to 
the related literature that found effects of weather on financial markets (Cao and Wei 2005, 
Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003, Kamstra et al. 2003, Saunders 1993). 
 
5. Study 3 
5.1 Data on ambiguity attitudes 
We conducted Study 3 using data from the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Study for the Social 
Sciences (LISS 2013). LISS is a representative household survey conducted by CentERdata at Tilburg 
University among 5,000 households and 8,000 individuals based on a true probability sample of 
households drawn from the population register by Statistics Netherlands. In January 2010, a randomly 
selected set of 2,491 individuals in LISS was invited to participate in a survey on ambiguity attitudes, 
out of which 1,933 individuals responded (see Dimmock et al. 2013 for data details). 
The respondents of the survey were presented with three tasks to measure their level of 
ambiguity. Each task elicited the probability equivalents of respondents for a likelihood level (either 
10%, 50%, or 90%), using known and ambiguous urns. One of the tasks used two-color urns as we 
did in Study 1. For this “1 color out of 2” task, the probability equivalents can be compared to 50%, 
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with lower values indicating ambiguity aversion (as in our gain task in Study 1). The two other tasks 
involved ten-color urns with the aim of varying the likelihood levels (as we did in Study 2). In one of 
these tasks, only one out of ten colors would allow the subjects to win 15 EUR. Probability 
equivalents lower (higher) than 10% would indicate ambiguity aversion (seeking). We will refer to 
this task as “1 color out of 10.” The third task involved 9 winning colors, which allows us to study 
ambiguity attitudes at high likelihood levels by comparing probability equivalents to 90%. We call 
this task “9 colors out of 10.” 
For each of the three tasks, the subjects could first choose which would be the winning 
color(s). This procedure has two advantages. It reduces suspicion from the subjects, and it rules out 
alternative explanations of ambiguity aversion. For instance, in the “1 color out of 2” task, if the 
subjects who chose to bet on red have a probability equivalent of less than 50%, the result cannot be 
explained by the subjects thinking red is less likely than black. If they have such beliefs, they would 
choose to bet on black. 
Probability equivalents were elicited using a bisection procedure (instead of choice lists as in 
Studies 1 and 2). This procedure relied on a series of binary choices between known and ambiguous 
urns. Within a given task, the ambiguous urn remained the same for all choices, while the known urn 
was adapted according to the respondent’s previous choices. The chance of winning with the known 
urn varied from the second round on, depending on the respondent's choice in the previous round 
(known or ambiguous). A task ended as soon as the respondent indicated to have no preference 
(indifference), or if the chance of winning fell below 2.5%. Each task consisted of six rounds at most. 
Before completing the survey, half of the respondents were randomly assigned to a condition 
in which they were told that one of their choices would be played out for a possible real reward of 15 
EUR, whereas the other half played for hypothetical rewards. In total, 510 respondents won a reward, 
for a total of 7,650 EUR paid in real incentives (Dimmock et al. 2013). 
We matched the probability equivalents with background information in LISS about the 
respondents’ gender, educational attainment (coded as years of schooling), age, working status 
(currently working, “yes” or “no”), and current subjective satisfaction with their financial situation as 
control variables for our regression analyses. Not all of the background variables were available for 
every individual, reducing the final dataset to 1,550 observations. We further matched these data with 
weather information about the response day. 
 
5.2 Weather data 
As a proxy for the affective state of the respondents during the completion of the ambiguity 
survey, we used official weather data from the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI 
2013), exploiting the fact that LISS contains detailed information about when the respondents 
completed the ambiguity survey. Data collection for the ambiguity survey took place from January 4 - 
27, 2010, and a summary of the weather during this time period is presented in Table 5. Temperatures 
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of approximately 0 degrees Celsius, a short sunshine duration, and periods of rain and snow are 
typical winter weather conditions in the Netherlands.  
 
Table 5: Average weather conditions per day in the Netherlands from January 4 - 27, 2010 
 Mean SE 
Temperature (in 0.1 degrees Celsius) -3.87 5.98 
Sunshine duration (in 0.1 hours per day) 16.00 4.30 
Precipitation duration (in 0.1 hours per day) 18.83 5.74 
Average cloudiness per day (from 0 to 9) 6.60 0.35 
Average mistiness per day (from 0 to 1) 0.09 0.03 
Source: KNMI (2013) and authors’ calculations, N = 24. 
 
The advantage of using weather data as proxies for affect is that changes in the weather are 
reasonably random, exogenous events that can influence affect (Denissen et al. 2008, Keller et al. 
2005, Kliger and Levy 2003, Parrot and Sabini 1990, Schwarz and Clore 1983, Sinclair et al. 1994), 
generating a natural experiment. Potential limitations include significant random variation across 
individuals of the effects of weather on affect and relatively small effects of weather on the overall 
variance in affective states (Denissen et al. 2008). However, for the purpose of hypothesis testing, 
these limitations can be mitigated by collecting a large enough sample that allows us to estimate small 
effect sizes precisely.  
Specifically, we assume in this study that a longer sunshine duration and higher temperatures 
have a positive influence on affect in the winter, based on previous findings in the literature 
(Cunningham 1979, Keller et al. 2005, Kripke 1998, Leppämäki et al. 2002, 2003, Parrott and Sabini 
1990, Schwarz and Clore 1983, Stain-Malmgren et al. 1998). Furthermore, we assume that cloudiness, 
mistiness and long periods of precipitation (i.e., a lack of sunshine) lead to sadness. The existing 
literature documents that seasonal conditions associated with a lack of sunshine (i.e., fall and winter) 
lead to an increase in depressive symptoms and seasonal affective disorder (Harmatz et al. 2000, 
Keller et al. 2005, Lurie et al. 2006, Molin et al. 1996, Rosenthal et al. 1984, Young et al. 1997). 
The effect of specific weather conditions may vary across seasons and regions (Keller et al. 
2005). For example, both sunshine and high temperature have been associated with positive affective 
states (Cunningham 1979, Keller et al. 2005) in moderate climate zones. However, sunshine tends to 
co-occur with lower temperatures in January in the Netherlands (see Table 6), which may bias the 
effects of these variables if they would be considered separately. 
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Table 6: Correlations of weather variables 
  T S P C 
Temperature 
(in 0.1 degrees Celsius) 
T -    
Sunshine duration 
(in 0.1 hours per day) 
S -0.34* 
 
-   
Precipitation duration 
(in 0.1 hours per day) 
P 0.13 
 
-0.35* 
 
-  
Average cloudiness per day 
(from 0 to 9) 
C 0.59*** 
 
-0.78*** 
 
0.33 
 
- 
Average mistiness per day 
(from 0 to 1) 
M 0.27 
 
0.24 
 
-0.29 
 
0.03 
 
Source: KNMI (2013) and authors’ calculations, N = 24, Pearson correlations are two-tailed * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
 
5.3 Results 
Table 7 classifies the respondents according to their ambiguity attitudes by comparing their 
probability equivalents for each task with the respective ambiguity neutrality threshold (10% in the “1 
color out of 10” task, 50% in the “1 color out of 2” task, and 90% in the “9 colors out of 10 task”). 
Consistent with the related literature and with our results from Studies 1 and 2, the respondents in this 
survey showed a tendency towards ambiguity seeking for low-likelihood events, whereas they tended 
towards ambiguity aversion for moderate- and high-likelihood events. 
 
Table 7: Frequency distribution of the respondents (N = 1,550) with ambiguity-averse, ambiguity-
neutral and ambiguity-seeking attitudes 
 1 color out of 10 1 color out of 2 9 colors out of 10 
Ambiguity averse 29.6% 62.8% 47.2% 
Ambiguity neutral 23.2% 16.1% 19.2% 
Ambiguity seeking 47.3% 21.2% 33.6% 
 
In the regression analyses below, we considered the available weather variables jointly to 
avoid biases resulting from the correlation structure of the weather variables (Table 6). We conducted 
various robustness checks by piecewise exclusion of these variables as well as by adding additional 
weather variables (rain, snow, ice formation) to the estimated model (see Appendix C, Tables C1-C2). 
Our main results are qualitatively robust to these changes. Furthermore, we also estimated Tobit 
instead of Ordinary Least Squares regressions and find qualitatively identical results. Table 8 presents 
the results of our regression model. The results show that cloudiness is associated with higher 
probability equivalents for events with moderate and high likelihood (“1 color out of 2” and “9 colors 
out of 10”). Hence, cloudiness is associated with smaller deviations from ambiguity neutrality. The 
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results for all of the other weather variables are insignificant or unstable, possibly due to the low, 
inconsistent influence of these variables on the respondents’ affective states.  
Our results also replicate those of Dimmock et al. (2013), who found that age, incentives and 
education correlate with ambiguity attitudes, whereas gender, working status and financial situation 
are not significantly associated with ambiguity attitudes. In particular, highly educated respondents 
behave more in line with ambiguity neutrality in this sample (they have lower probability equivalents 
for the “1 color out of 10” task and higher probability equivalents for the “9 colors out of 10” task). 
Financial incentives in the survey consistently lead to more ambiguity aversion (lower probability 
equivalents), whereas older respondents are consistently less ambiguity averse across the three tasks.  
We tested whether the respondents in the incentivized version of the ambiguity survey reacted 
in the same way to the weather as the respondents who made purely hypothetical decisions. For this 
purpose, we used a generalized version of the Chow test (Chow 1960, Gujarati 1970) for sample 
poolability, i.e., running OLS in the combined sample and including interaction terms between the 
weather variables and the incentive dummy. Our results showed no evidence that the respondents who 
played for real money were less affected in their decisions by cloudiness (see Appendix C, Table C3). 
 
Table 8: OLS regressions on probability equivalents 
 1 color out of 10 1 color out of 2 9 colors out of 10 
 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Temperature -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.03 
Sunshine duration -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Precipitation duration -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
Cloudiness 0.07 0.05 0.12** 0.05 0.11** 0.05 
Mistiness -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
   Incentive -0.09*** 0.03 -0.06** 0.03 -0.05** 0.03 
   Female 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 
   Education -0.05* 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.08*** 0.03 
   Age 0.14*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 
   Working status -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
   Financially satisfied -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Model diagnostics 
N 1,550 1,550 1,550 
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 3.9% 2.3% 1.8% 
Note: Betas are standardized. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
 
6. Discussion 
The results of our three independent studies are consistent and point in the same direction: 
sadness and cloudiness (which is often considered to trigger sadness) lead to fewer deviations from 
payoff-maximizing behavior in ambiguous situations. In the ambiguity tasks studied here, both 
ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking can be viewed as suboptimal because they decreased the 
expected monetary payoffs of the subjects. Furthermore, diversions from ambiguity neutrality can 
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even be deemed irrational because they lead to violations of dynamic consistency or of 
consequentialism (see, for instance, Al-Najjar and Weinstein 2009). Hence, the “wise” strategy in our 
studies was to be ambiguity neutral. We found such payoff-maximizing behavior more frequently 
among subjects in the sadness groups in Studies 1 and 2 and by those who responded to the LISS 
survey (Study 3) on cloudy days. 
Even though sadness did not have a statistically significant effect for all tasks, the effects we 
observed were consistent in the same direction and compatible with more analytic information 
processing. This improved information processing could indeed be expected from an affective state 
with a negative valence (Andrews and Thompson 2009, Mackie and Worth 1989, Schwarz 1990, 
Schwarz and Clore 1996). However, the valence dimension cannot fully explain our results. In line 
with the valence perspective, fear as a negative affective state should also lead to more analytic and 
focused information processing and in turn to less deviation from profit-maximizing behavior. 
Instead, the arousal dimension of affect may be vital to understand the differential effects of sadness 
and fear.  
Affective states high on arousal are generally supposed to inhibit information processing 
(Sanbonmatsu and Kardes 1998). Hence, an arousal perspective would suggest that affective states 
that are high on arousal (happiness, fear) lead to less structured information processing compared with 
affective states that are low on arousal (sadness). However, there are also findings that are 
inconsistent with this perspective, showing that fear, a negatively valenced but arousing affective 
state, promotes structured, systematic and focused thinking and attention to detail (Baas et al. 2011, 
Friedman and Förster 2010, Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001, Tiedens and Linton 2001), encoding of 
information into detailed conceptual categories (Mikulincer et al. 1990), and systematic idea 
generation (De Dreu et al. 2008). Hence, although the effects of fear as a high arousal affect on 
information processing were shown to be mixed in existing studies, our results are in line with early 
studies that suggested that a high arousing affect is associated with inhibited information processing 
(e.g., Sanbonmatsu and Kardes 1998). Therefore, the different effects of sadness and fear on 
ambiguity attitudes may be explained by their different arousal levels and their associated 
information-processing mode. 
With regard to the effects of joy on ambiguity attitudes, our results suggest that joy has 
similar effects as fear. Although joy and fear have different valence levels, they may both be regarded 
as arousing affective states that seem to have inhibited the subjects’ information-processing mode 
(e.g., Sanbonmatsu and Kardes 1998). The holistic, intuitive information-processing strategy triggered 
by joy and by fear possibly leads to a stronger deviation from profit-maximizing behavior in 
ambiguous decision situations compared with sadness. 
In addition to the results regarding affect and ambiguity attitudes, our studies’ findings are 
consistent with earlier results showing a tendency towards ambiguity-seeking behavior for low 
likelihoods and towards ambiguity aversion for intermediate and high likelihoods in the gain domain 
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(Wakker 2010 p.292). The latter behavior is a form of likelihood insensitivity (behaving as if all 
likelihoods were close to 50-50) and is often considered to be a cognitive bias (Wakker 2010 p.317). 
Our results suggest that sadness reduces this cognitive bias because it decreases ambiguity-seeking 
behavior for small likelihoods and ambiguity aversion for high likelihoods. This result is compatible 
with more focused information processing triggered by sadness.  
Several alternative explanations for our results do not seem very convincing. First, sad people 
have been found to be more willing to pay to acquire some goods (Cryder et al. 2008). This result 
could explain why the probability equivalent of the sadness group in the gain task in Study 1 was 
higher than that of the other groups, but it could not explain why we found the opposite for the 
triangle task in Study 2 (in which the subjects in the sadness group had a lower probability equivalent, 
suggesting a lower willingness to bet, than the other groups). Second, it could be claimed that the 
respondents in Study 3 were more ambiguity neutral on cloudy days because they had more time to 
dedicate to the questionnaire (the bad weather prevented them from doing other activities). Such an 
explanation can be ruled out because the fastest answering strategy was to be ambiguity neutral.7 The 
subjects should therefore have been more ambiguity neutral on sunny days, not less.  
Our result that sadness leads to more ambiguity-neutral attitudes may help to explain why 
stock market returns tend to be lower on cloudy days than on sunny days (Hirshleifer and Shumway 
2003, Saunders 1993) as well as on shorter days (i.e., fall and winter, Kamstra et al. 2003). The most 
common explanation for these phenomena is that investors’ moods could be influenced by these 
exogenous events (e.g., due to seasonal affective disorder), which may influence their risk preferences 
and in turn influence investment decisions and market outcomes. Yet, Watson and Funck (2012) 
showed that short selling (a risky investment strategy) by professional traders actually increases on 
cloudy days, but not on the three prior days before the cloudy event. This suggests that professional 
traders do not correctly anticipate downward market movements based on weather forecasts. Instead, 
even professional short sellers seem to be affected in their investment decisions by weather events, 
but not in a way that would be consistent with higher risk aversion on cloudy days.  
We suggest that these inconsistencies may be resolved by taking the influence of ambiguity 
attitudes on trading behavior into account. Specifically, Dow and Werlang (1992) and Bossaerts et al. 
(2010) find that ambiguity aversion leads to decreased market participation, while Dimmock et al. 
(2013) show that ambiguity-generated insensitivity has the same effect. According to these findings, 
more ambiguity-neutral attitudes should lead to greater market participation. The sadness-induced 
shift towards ambiguity-neutrality that we document in this study is thus consistent with both the 
lower market returns and the higher participation of short sellers on cloudy days.  
  
                                                            
7 In the bisection procedure explained above, being indifferent (i.e., indicating no preference) in the first choice 
would signal ambiguity neutrality and stop the elicitation immediately.  
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7. Conclusion 
Our study identifies affect as a transient cause of ambiguity attitudes, with sadness leading to 
more ambiguity-neutral, payoff-maximizing behavior. Thus, typically unobserved differences in 
affective states among people can contribute towards heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes. Given the 
prevalence of ambiguous decision environments, our results suggest that random, exogenous 
fluctuations in people’s affective states could influence a broad spectrum of economic behavior 
through their impact on ambiguity attitudes, such as financial investments, innovation or market entry. 
An open question is whether individuals could learn to overcome the temporary preference shocks of 
their moods or, alternatively, if affect is a necessary component of the human ability to think and 
behave (Damasio 2005), with its potentially negative side effects (Schelling 1984). 
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Appendix A: Study 1 
Pretest with film clips for Study 1 
To prepare for Study 1, we conducted a pretest with 50 students (4 sessions) in a Dutch 
university’s behavioral laboratory in April 2010 to check the effectiveness of the film clips, and we 
measured affects with three subscales (joviality, fear, sadness) from the Positive And Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS-X, Watson and Clark 1994). In this pretest, we used film clips recommended by 
Gross and Levenson (1995) and Hewig et al. (2005), including “Silence of the Lambs” (1991) to 
induce a fearful mood. However, unlike the joyful and sad clips, the fearful film clip did not induce 
fear successfully. Thus, we prepared two new film clips, one from “Halloween” (1978) and one from 
“Paranormal Activity” (2007), which we showed to 20 friends and colleagues. Based on their 
judgments, we decided to use a film clip from “Paranormal Activity.” 
 
Tasks and questionnaires 
At the beginning of the experiment and before the subjects watched the film clips, they 
completed questions about their socio-economic status, including age, gender, current occupation, 
level of education, academic major, relationship status, entrepreneurial intentions (Reynolds et al. 
2005), risk preferences (Dohmen et al. 2011), Big 5 personality domains (Gosling et al. 2003), and the 
joviality, fear, and sadness subscale of the PANAS-X (Watson and Clark 1994). After the subjects 
had watched the film clips, we asked them whether they had seen the film before. Subsequently, the 
subjects again indicated their affective state on the three PANAS-X subscales.  
The experiment contained six decision tasks, two of which were the tasks on ambiguity 
preferences reported in the main text. The other tasks were two measures of absolute and relative 
overconfidence (Blavatskyy 2009, Urbig et al. 2009) and two tasks on risk preferences involving 
gains and losses (Holt and Laury 2002). After all of the experimental tasks were completed and before 
the subjects drew their payoff, we asked them about their general positive and negative affect 
(PANAS-X, Watson and Clark 1994) to check how long the affect induction lasted. 
 
Effect of movies on self-reported moods in Study 1 
Within-subject differences in self-reported moods from the PANAS-X measures before and 
after the movie clip were in line with our desired mood induction. We report here the means (M), 
standard errors (SE), paired t-tests (t and p), and Cohen’s ds. The subjects in the joyful group reported 
that their joy before induction (M = 2.43, SE = 0.09) was lower than after induction (M = 2.85, SE = 
0.11; t[df = 69] = -3.85, p = 0.00; d = 0.93). In the fear group, fear before induction (M = 1.14, SE = 
0.02) was lower than after induction (M = 2.13, SE = 0.06; t[df = 75] = -9.69, p = 0.00; d = 2.24). 
Similarly in the sadness group, sadness before induction (M = 1.38, SE = 0.06) was lower than after 
induction (M = 2.24, SE = 0.10; t[df = 75] = -7.43, p = 0.00; d = 1.72). The effect sizes d indicate that 
the movies had a relatively large effect on the participants’ affects. An ANOVA for self-reported fear 
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(F [3, 286] = 1.31, p = 0.27, partial η2 = 0.01), sadness (F [3, 286] = 1.03, p = 0.38, partial η2 = 0.01), 
and joy (F [3, 286 = 1.47, p = 0.22, partial η2 = 0.02) before induction revealed no significant 
differences between the experimental groups; an ANOVA for self-reported fear ( F[3, 289] = 36,02, p 
= 0.00, partial η2 = 0.27), sadness (F [3, 289] = 39.52, p = 0.00, partial η2 = 0.29), and joy (F [3, 289] 
= 62.69, p = 0.00, partial η2 = 0.39) after the induction showed differences between the experimental 
groups. 
 
Appendix B: Study 2 
Questions to check exchangeability 
Do you agree with the following statements? (I agree / I disagree) 
1. I think there are more triangles than squares in Urn B. 
2. I have no reason to think that there are more triangles than squares in Urn B. 
3. I think there are more triangles than rectangles in Urn B. 
4. I have no reason to think that there are more triangles than rectangles in Urn B. 
5. I think there are more squares than rectangles in Urn B. 
6. I have no reason to think that there are more squares than rectangles in Urn B. 
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Appendix C: Robustness checks for Study 3 
Table C1: OLS regressions on probability equivalents – piecewise exclusion of weather variables 
other than cloudiness 
 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
 1 color out of 10
Temperature - - -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 
Sunshine duration -0.01 0.04 - - -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 
Precipitation duration -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 - - -0.03 0.03 
Cloudiness 0.06 0.04 0.08** 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Mistiness -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.03 - - 
Incentive -0.09*** 0.03 -0.09*** 0.03 -0.09*** 0.03 -0.09*** 0.03 
Female 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Education -0.05* 0.03 -0.05* 0.03 -0.05* 0.03 -0.05* 0.03 
Age 0.14*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.03 
Working status -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Financially satisfied -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
Model diagnostics 
N 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 3.9% 3.9% 3.8% 3.9% 
 1 color out of 2 
Temperature - - -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Sunshine duration 0.06 0.04 - - 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Precipitation duration -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 - - -0.03 0.03 
Cloudiness 0.10** 0.04 0.06* 0.03 0.11** 0.05 0.09** 0.04 
Mistiness -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 - - 
Incentive -0.06** 0.03 -0.06** 0.03 -0.06** 0.03 -0.06** 0.03 
Female -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Education -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.03 
Age 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03
Working status -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Financially satisfied -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Model diagnostics 
N 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 
 9 colors out of 10
Temperature - - -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
Sunshine duration 0.04 0.04 - - 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04
Precipitation duration -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 - - -0.03 0.03 
Cloudiness 0.08* 0.05 0.07** 0.03 0.10* 0.05 0.07* 0.04 
Mistiness -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 - - 
Incentive -0.05* 0.03 -0.05* 0.03 -0.05* 0.03 -0.05* 0.03 
Female 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Education 0.08*** 0.03 0.08*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.08*** 0.03
Age 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 
Working status -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Financially satisfied 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Model diagnostics 
N 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 
Note: Betas are standardized. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.  
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Table C4: OLS regressions on probability equivalents, including additional weather variables 
 1 color out of 10 1 color out of 2 9 colors out of 10 
 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Temperature -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.09 0.05 
Sunshine duration 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05 
Precipitation duration -0.06 0.07 -0.06 0.07 -0.11* 0.07 
Cloudiness 0.09 0.06 0.11* 0.06 0.13** 0.06 
Mistiness -0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.05 
Rain 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.06 
Snow 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Ice formation -0.04 0.08 0.02 0.08 -0.07 0.08 
Incentive -0.09*** 0.03 -0.06** 0.03 -0.05* 0.03 
Female 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 
Education -0.05* 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.08*** 0.03 
Age 0.14*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 
Working status -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Financially satisfied -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Model diagnostics 
N 1,550 1,550 1,550 
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 3.9% 2.4% 1.9% 
Note: Betas are standardized. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table C5: OLS regressions on probability equivalents, poolability test for incentive group versus 
non-incentive group 
 1 color out of 10 1 color out of 2 9 colors out of 10 
 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Temperature -0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.04 
Temperate*Incentive -0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Sunshine duration -0.10 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 
Sunshine*Incentive 0.15** 0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.07 
Precipitation duration -0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04
Precipitation*Incentive 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.08* 0.04 
Cloudiness 0.02 0.07 0.15** 0.07 0.12* 0.07 
Cloudiness*Incentive 0.25 0.22 -0.15 0.22 -0.04 0.22 
Mistiness 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.04 
Mistiness*Incentive -0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.05 
Incentive -0.40* 0.23 0.08 0.23 0.07 0.23
Female 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 
Education -0.05* 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.08*** 0.03 
Age 0.14*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 
Working status -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Financially satisfied -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Model diagnostics 
N 1,550 1,550 1,550 
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.01 
R2 4.2% 2.5% 2.1% 
Note: Betas are standardized. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
